经济学系双周学术论坛简介：
为了进一步加强对传统优势学科政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史的研究交流，经济学系开展“双周学术论坛”，邀请经济学系和其他系、所、中心师生介绍前沿科研成果，为广大经济学子打造一个高品质的学术交流平台。论坛研讨方向主要突出政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史，兼容发展经济学与应用微观等方向，立足中国国情，讲好中国故事。
Non-linear pricing with reneging
中文
This paper studies a dynamic non-linear pricing problem, adding the possibility that the seller can costly renege on the initial contracts, which is common in reality in the forms of false advertising, add-on pricing and bait-and-switch. While reneging allows the seller to earn more surplus by offering a new full-extraction contract after learning the buyer’s preference, a forward looking buyer will hide information. We fully characterize the equilibrium direct mechanism with the presence of this strategic interaction and show that the quality distortion may be mitigated and participation can be higher when the market moves from full-commitment to one with modest reneging cost. In addition, we show that pooling mechanism can be also optimal since the seller can forgone learning opportunity in order to commit. We establish the precise condition under which the welfare improvement happens and further relate it to whether the market is niche or mass. Moreover, we show that in the sequential equilibrium, there always exists an implementable contract throughout the game even if the seller has already incurred the reneging cost and is free to modify it. By explicitly modeling seller’s information extraction problem without full commitment, our results have policy implications on protecting consumers from deceptive business tactics.
编辑/陈文勋 李学勇
技术支持/丁琳
