Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions

作者： •
主讲人 Yu Chen 简介 <p class="MsoNormal">We provide a generalized model concerning the one-shot pure-strategy moral hazard contracting game with the inclusion of observable actions as well as unobservable actions. The outcome, action, and reward spaces are assumed to be all metrizable and compact and allowed to be uncountable and multi-dimensional. We find that employing observable-action-and-outcome-contingent contracts is strategically equivalent to employing pure outcome-contingent contracts, as long as the principal can specify and enforce individual rational observable actions to the agent. This transformation result brings analytic advantage in relevant scenarios. We then propose conditions under which the optimal solution to such a principal-agent problem exists.</p>
时间 2016-11-17(Thursday)16:40-18:00 地点 N303, Econ Building
讲座语言 English 主办单位
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联系人信息 主持人 Yun Wang
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主讲人简介 <p>Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Business School, Nanjing University.</p> <p><a href="/Upload/File/2016/11/2016110804532365.pdf"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 255);"><u><strong>Yu Chen's CV</strong></u></span></a></p> 期数 “WISE-SOE”高级经济学系列讲座2016秋季学期第5讲（总第370讲）
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