| 主讲人 |
Qiaoxi Zhang |
简介 |
<p>Learning is crucial to effective organizational decision making, but often it has to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal needs to decide on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns about the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. Our results show that private learning gives rise to the tradeoff between how much information to acquire and how promptly the acquired information is reflected in the decision. We discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations.</p> |
| 时间 |
2021-06-10(Thursday)16:40-18:00 |
地点 |
Room N302, Economics Building |
| 讲座语言 |
English |
主办单位 |
厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院 |
| 承办单位 |
厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院 |
类型 |
系列讲座 |
| 联系人信息 |
|
主持人 |
Jiong Zhu |
| 专题网站 |
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专题 |
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| 主讲人简介 |
<p>Qiaoxi Zhang received her PhD in Economics from Caltech in 2016. She has been working on game theory in Chile from 2016-2020. She will join Xiamen University as an assistant professor in Fall 2021.</p> |
期数 |
经济学科学术新秀系列讲座第10讲 |
