【学术聚焦▪论坛预告】经济学系双周学术论坛（二十三）

报告摘要

This paper studies the procedure of mass vaccination as an optimal experimentation problem. Vaccination protects against infection but may cause unwanted side effects. The safety of vaccination can be learned through monitoring the vaxxed population. We derive the optimal vaccination scheme that balances short-run payoff and learning. We also study a game in which players choose when to get vaxxed. As a behavior with positive externality, others getting vaxxed discourages a player from doing so but encourages a player to get vaxxed by proving vaccine safety. We characterize an equilibrium in which the population gradually achieves herd immunity if the vaccine is safe. We also provide a simple policy that drives the equilibrium toward the socially optimal level.

为了进一步加强对传统优势学科政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史的研究交流，经济学系开展“双周学术论坛”，邀请经济学系和其他系、所、中心师生介绍前沿科研成果，为广大经济学子打造一个高品质的学术交流平台。论坛研讨方向主要突出政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史，兼容发展经济学与应用微观等方向，立足中国国情，讲好中国故事。

The Economics Biweekly Academic Forum is organized by the department of economics in Xiamen University. This forum mainly discusses the topics in the field of political economics, economic history and history of economic thought, with the aim to strengthen the communication between these traditional disciplines and the state of the art in the literature. This forum invites speakers and research students from various departments, which is a high quality platform for academic communication and research discussion. The forum also provides an excellent stage to tell Chinese economics story with precise academic language and Chinese culture.