【学术聚焦▪论坛预告】经济学系双周学术论坛（十六）

报告摘要

This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal to the principal for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria and implementation requirements. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-solvable way, starting from the first agent. I apply the general results to networks and pure/impure public goods/bads.

为了进一步加强对传统优势学科政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史的研究交流，经济学系开展“双周学术论坛”，邀请经济学系和其他系、所、中心师生介绍前沿科研成果，为广大经济学子打造一个高品质的学术交流平台。论坛研讨方向主要突出政治经济学、经济史和经济思想史，兼容发展经济学与应用微观等方向，立足中国国情，讲好中国故事。

The Economics Biweekly Academic Forum is organized by the department of economics in Xiamen University. This forum mainly discusses the topics in the field of political economics, economic history and history of economic thought, with the aim to strengthen the communication between these traditional disciplines and the state of the art in the literature. This forum invites speakers and research students from various departments, which is a high quality platform for academic communication and research discussion. The forum also provides an excellent stage to tell Chinese economics story with precise academic language and Chinese culture.